Chinese threat actors are reshaping the landscape of anti-analysis techniques by leveraging a complex network of proxy devices on a global scale. The operational relay box network (ORB) is a sophisticated infrastructure consisting of virtual private servers (VPS) and compromised smart devices and routers, facilitating malicious activities while evading detection. While ORBs have been in existence for years, their prevalence and complexity have surged since 2020, particularly in China and other cyber-threat hotspots like Russia.

A recent report by analysts from Mandiant highlights the need for a paradigm shift in how defenders approach cybersecurity in the face of such advanced threat infrastructures. With Chinese ORBs gaining traction for their efficacy in concealing malicious activities, attributing attacks to specific threat actors based on static indicators of compromise (IoC) like IP addresses is no longer viable. Mandiant proposes viewing command-and-control infrastructures as advanced persistent threats (APTs) in themselves, with constantly evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Michael Raggi, principal analyst with Mandiant by Google Cloud, explains the evolution of infrastructure-as-a-service, where threat actors utilize dynamic support networks within ORBs. The changing nature of these networks makes it challenging for defenders to attribute activities to specific actors, as multiple threat clusters may be operating within the same network simultaneously.

ORBs, maintained by private entities or government elements in China, comprise different layers, including Chinese servers, VPSes, traversal nodes, and exit nodes. These nodes serve various functions, from managing network nodes to bridging connections between the ORB and victim environments. Mandiant categorizes ORBs into provisioned and nonprovisioned groups, with a vast array of threat actors utilizing these networks to orchestrate attacks.

The geographic diversity and short lifespan of ORB nodes pose significant challenges for defenders, as these networks constantly evolve to evade detection. Attackers can leverage this dynamic infrastructure to launch sophisticated campaigns, such as APT 31’s utilization of the hybrid ORB2 Florahox network. The global reach of ORBs allows threat actors to bypass geographic restrictions and obfuscate their origins, making attribution more difficult for defenders.

In response to the evolving threat landscape, organizations must shift their focus from blocking individual IPs to analyzing and monitoring ORBs as independent entities. Raggi emphasizes the importance of developing behavior-based signatures to detect malicious activities within these complex networks. By studying infrastructure patterns, compromised devices, and communication protocols, defenders can create dynamic threat profiles that enable proactive threat detection and response.

The rise of ORBs demonstrates the sophistication and adaptability of Chinese threat actors in evading detection and carrying out cyber espionage activities. As defenders grapple with the challenges posed by these complex networks, a proactive and dynamic approach to threat analysis and mitigation is essential to combatting the evolving cyber threat landscape.

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