UK Proposes Crisis Powers Over Cable Operators and Up to 14 Years for Sabotage
By Chris Riotta, October 23, 2026
In a significant move aimed at bolstering national security, UK security analysts are urging the United States to take heed of the UK’s recent legislative proposals concerning the protection of undersea cables. The British government has recommended a major overhaul of its 19th-century undersea cable law, laying the groundwork for emergency powers over cable operators and suggesting prison sentences of up to 14 years for acts of sabotage. This urgent legislative initiative comes in light of increasing concerns surrounding foreign threats, particularly from Russia, which has been accused of surveilling undersea cables integral for global communications.
The UK government released a white paper outlining these proposals, highlighting the necessity for ministers to direct cable operators during national security crises. This would include creating new offenses specifically targeting sabotage of undersea cables. The urgency for these measures is underscored by allegations that Russian military operations have been responsible for several incidents involving damaged cables in the Baltic Sea, raising alarms about potential disruptions in critical communication infrastructures.
Aybars Tuncdogan, an associate professor at King’s College London, weighed in on the implications of these proposed changes. He indicated that Washington could greatly benefit from a similar update to its own submarine cable law. Current legislation in the United States, known as the Submarine Cable Act of 1888, imposes a maximum prison sentence of just two years for deliberately damaging undersea cables. Tuncdogan argues that a revision to impose more severe penalties could serve as a robust deterrent against both foreign state actors and insider threats.
While U.S. legislators are currently considering various bills that focus on sanctions, coordination, and licensing related to undersea cables, they still fall short of the more drastic measures that the UK is contemplating. One such bipartisan effort, the Strategic Subsea Cables Act, was introduced in Congress last year with the intent of imposing sanctions on foreign individuals who harm undersea cables. Additionally, Representatives Rob Menendez and August Pfluger recently introduced a bill aimed at standardizing licensing processes and enforcing national security requirements for cables landing on U.S. soil.
According to Savvas Christodoulou, a researcher affiliated with King’s College London, the existing penalties under the U.S. submarine cable law are outdated and ineffective against the threats posed by state-sponsored actors. He posits that any forthcoming legislation in the U.S. should incorporate modern criminal offenses, including provisions for reckless conduct associated with accidental damages during incidents like anchor-dragging. For effective governance, he stresses the necessity of a clear legal framework, defined triggers for intervention, and adequate congressional oversight.
Andrew Grotto, co-director of Stanford University’s Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance, also contributed to the discussion by suggesting that enhancing criminal penalties could be a step in the right direction. However, he expresses doubts about their efficacy in deterring major nations like Russia or China, which might choose to compromise undersea communication systems if it serves their national interests.
In a related context, UK Security Minister Dan Jarvis recently articulated the rationale behind these new legislative measures, emphasizing the need to proactively safeguard against entities with malicious intent. He and Telecoms Minister Ian Murray reinforced that undersea cables are essential to modern British life, serving as critical conduits for global communication.
The proposed powers, if enacted, would afford UK ministers a "tightly constrained backstop" in cases where the threat to undersea cables poses a national security risk. This could authorize actions such as requiring cable operators to share data, reroute traffic, or even suspend services in the national interest. Operators failing to comply with these directives might face hefty fines—potentially reaching as high as £17 million ($22.8 million)—as well as daily penalties for ongoing violations.
Nonetheless, Christodoulou raises concerns regarding the potential for these emergency powers to be exercised without sufficient legal oversight. He warns that secret orders lacking rigorous scrutiny could betray the trust of cable operators and damage the collaborative spirit essential for national security efforts.
Dwayne Winseck, a professor at Carleton University, echoes this sentiment, emphasizing that although such powers are not uncommon in democracies, their implementation should be subject to judicial review to ensure adherence to lawful practices.
Under the new legislation, intentional sabotage could lead to sentences of up to 14 years in prison, reckless conduct up to 10 years, and gross negligence carrying a maximum penalty of two years. This shift would effectively replace outdated provisions outlined in the Submarine Telegraph Act of 1885.
In conclusion, Tuncdogan insists that the UK’s efforts to reinforce the security of its subsea cables are of paramount importance not just for British national security but also for its allies, particularly NATO member states. He warns that disruptions to these critical communication links could have far-reaching consequences, underscoring the interconnected nature of modern global communications. As international tensions rise, the call for more stringent measures to protect undersea cables grows ever more urgent.