In a hypothetical scenario where China attacks Taiwan, the critical communications infrastructure of the island nation would be at risk of severe cyberattacks. Last year, Dr. Nina A. Kollars and Jason Vogt, both associate professors at the US Naval War College (USNWC) Cyber and Innovation Policy Institute (CIPI), organized a war game with government and private sector cybersecurity experts to brainstorm innovative strategies to defend Taiwan’s crucial communication networks.
The backdrop of the simulation was set in the future, on August 6, 2030, where escalating tensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan reached a breaking point due to political developments favoring Taiwan’s independence. With the risk of military intervention looming, the PRC aimed to disrupt Taiwan’s military and civilian communications before initiating an invasion.
During the war game, experts identified 65 potential strategies for Taiwan to prepare for such a scenario. Suggestions ranged from practical measures like utilizing ham radio in mobile network downtime to more ambitious endeavors such as investing in modular nuclear reactors or tidal power generation. Some unconventional ideas were also proposed, like leveraging civilians or cultural artifacts as deterrents against military strikes.
One of the key challenges highlighted in the discussions was Taiwan’s unique vulnerability due to its geography and interconnected infrastructure. Unlike Ukraine, which has land borders for resource access, Taiwan heavily relies on undersea cables for connectivity, some of which pass through China. Additionally, Taiwan imports a significant portion of its energy needs, further complicating its position in the event of a conflict.
The experts emphasized the importance of maintaining communication channels akin to the “Zelensky playbook,” referring to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s efforts to ensure uninterrupted communication within his country and with the international community. Taiwan’s susceptibility to blockade and its limited options for resource diversification added to its challenges in defending against potential cyber and physical attacks.
As the war game progressed, strategies to counter cyber warfare, kinetic strikes, and disruption of critical infrastructure were explored. China’s formidable military capabilities posed a significant threat to Taiwan’s defense mechanisms, prompting a need for innovative and cost-effective solutions. The majority of proposed strategies focused on investing in resilient infrastructure, preparing for recovery, and strategically locating critical resources to mitigate potential threats.
Despite the grim outlook of Taiwan’s defensibility, the exercise underscored the importance of prioritizing practical and accessible solutions. Ideas such as utilizing Bluetooth or Raspberry Pi mesh networks as backup communication systems and empowering the civilian population with cybersecurity skills garnered significant attention. The emphasis on public awareness campaigns, training programs, and creating civilian cyber cores highlighted the crucial role of societal readiness in maintaining communication resilience in times of crisis.
In conclusion, the war game organized by the US Naval War College shed light on the complex challenges facing Taiwan’s defense of its critical communications infrastructure against potential Chinese aggression. By fostering collaboration between cybersecurity experts and exploring innovative strategies, the exercise provided valuable insights into the proactive measures needed to safeguard Taiwan’s communication networks in an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape.