Critical Infrastructure Security,
Cyberwarfare / Nation-State Attacks,
Fraud Management & Cybercrime
Salt Typhoon Exposed Major Flaws in Telecom Networks. Few Changes Have Been Made

Recent assessments indicate that the telecommunications sector is among the most susceptible fields following a series of government-backed cyberattacks reportedly linked to China, which infiltrated U.S. carrier networks in what some experts label one of the most extensive breaches in American history. Alarmingly, there has been scant progress in addressing the vulnerabilities exposed by these events.
During a recent session held by the House Energy and Commerce Committee, a group of national security and telecommunications specialists raised serious concerns regarding the implications of the Salt Typhoon hacking. Jamil Jaffer, founder and executive director of the National Security Institute, voiced that the breaches signify a glaring failure in U.S. cyber defenses aimed at safeguarding critical infrastructure. Jaffer lamented the limited results achieved despite a flurry of activity, including the establishment of a White House unified coordination group, various law enforcement investigations, and the probe by a Cyber Safety Review Board.
Jaffer starkly stated, “The stark reality is we are not currently positioned to provide for a comprehensive defense of our nation, nor the global telecommunications systems or networks that American companies help operate.” This sobering assessment underscores an alarming lack of preparedness to undertake necessary actions that could bolster the nation’s cyber resilience.
Panelists participating in the discussion emphasized the growing intensity of adversarial intelligence operations. They highlighted that advancements in artificial intelligence have significantly enhanced data processing capabilities. Yet, despite these advancements, the telecom sector finds itself incapable of detecting immediate threats, even with improved public-private information sharing and enhanced internal cybersecurity measures. Laura Galante, a seasoned cybersecurity intelligence analyst, articulated the gravity of the situation, stating, “Despite the telecoms’ significant internal cybersecurity programs, detecting the Salt Typhoon compromise has required an extensive joint government-industry response.” She further stressed the necessity of evolving into a more dynamic operational security model than what currently exists.
Notably, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) was reportedly the first to detect early signs of Chinese hackers targeting U.S. telecommunications systems. Jaffer expressed astonishment that CISA might have identified the threat actors linked to Salt Typhoon before telecom companies were able to do so, drawing a parallel to the findings of the 9/11 Commission, which revealed that government entities had anticipated a significant terrorist attack yet failed to disseminate actionable intelligence promptly.
Expert testimonies previously provided to lawmakers suggested that further cyberattacks orchestrated by Chinese state actors are likely inevitable. They advocated for a comprehensive overhaul of U.S. government cyber defenses to avert future breaches aiming at telecom networks. A particularly troubling observation involved senior White House officials utilizing unsecured platforms and third-party applications like Signal, raising concerns that such practices could further compromise sensitive governmental intelligence.
Tom Stroup, president of the Satellite Industry Association, also contributed to the discourse, warning that “China is closing the gap” appreciably in the space sector while simultaneously investing in critical infrastructure that poses dire challenges for U.S. national security. With a recent report indicating that a substantial segment of key U.S. allies and mobile operators across 35 nations routes sensitive telecommunications traffic through infrastructure owned by China, the stakes appear significantly elevated.
Stroup aptly captured the essence of the risk, stating, “These capabilities will come with backdoor security risks for China to exploit.” He emphasized the urgent need for the United States to spearhead the development of international standards regarding spectrum and telecommunications. Should the U.S. fail to take robust actions, Stroup cautioned, “China will fill the void,” thereby jeopardizing both American national interests and global democratic frameworks.