Title: Russian Wartime Disinformation and Influence Operations Persist, Altering the Future Landscape
Introduction
Russian influence operations, characterized by disinformation and manipulation tactics, continue to persist despite a temporary respite in cyberattacks. This article explores the recent themes in these operations, the implications of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death on future operations, Russian influence targeting NATO’s summit, the ongoing rehabilitation of Stalin’s image in Russia, and the morally coarsening effect of war amplified by social media.
Wartime Disinformation: The Current Landscape
Although there has been a lull in cyberattacks, Russian disinformation campaigns remain active. Recent efforts have focused on spreading the narrative that Poland desires to regain territories annexed by the Soviet Union, a claim that has been effectively debunked by the Canadian government’s fact-checking initiative. These campaigns aim to portray Russia as a victim of aggression orchestrated by Ukraine and the United States.
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov recently gave a lengthy interview reiterating this narrative and accusing the United States of seeking to weaken Russia. President Putin, unable to attend the BRICS conference due to complications arising from his indictment for war crimes, blamed grain shortages on Western sanctions while disregarding Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea agreement and its attacks on Ukrainian grain facilities.
Disinformation Campaigns Aimed at NATO Summit
Russian influence operations have also targeted NATO’s July summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. Graphika, an online social media analysis company, revealed that the disinformation campaign aimed to divide France from other NATO members and involved the dissemination of stolen documents from the Lithuanian government. The campaign was carried out by two distinct operations: Doppelganger and Secondary Infektion.
Doppelganger, described as a sprawling campaign impersonating media outlets and government agencies, aimed to propagate pro-Russian messaging. Secondary Infektion, a known group, employed fake personas to distribute falsified and hacked documents online. While the campaign was complex and extensive, it failed to gain traction outside of existing pro-Kremlin communities. Social media users, including influential pro-Kremlin figures, exposed the campaign as fake.
The Future of Russian Influence Operations
With the recent death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the prominent figure behind the Internet Research Agency (IRA), the future of Russian influence operations faces uncertainty. The IRA had already announced its cessation of operations following the march on Moscow. However, it is expected that Russian intelligence services, particularly the GRU, will continue to adopt the disinformation template established by the IRA.
Gavin Wilde, a senior fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and formerly a US National Security Council director for Russia, Baltic, and Caucasus affairs, stated that Prigozhin’s death may result in a saturated market of copycats that are unlikely to reach the prominence achieved by the IRA.
Stalin’s Rehabilitation and the Morally Coarsening Effect of War
The rehabilitation of Stalin’s image in Russia is a concerning trend. A Russian Orthodox priest recently blessed a new monument to Stalin, shedding light on the complex relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state. This development reflects the moral coarsening effects of war, as the perpetrator of political mass murder now receives posthumous blessings from the descendants of his victims.
The morally coarsening effect of war is further amplified by social media, which often serves as a platform for the propagation of disinformation and callous reactions to tragic events. The recent missile strike in Chernihiv, Ukraine resulted in the death of a six-year-old girl, Sophia Holynska. Shockingly, a Russian Telegram channel posted a picture of an impromptu memorial for Sophia with a caption mocking her death. This highlights the disregard for human suffering exhibited on social media platforms.
Conclusion
Russian influence operations, characterized by disinformation and manipulation tactics, persist despite a temporary lull in cyberattacks. Recent themes in these operations seek to manipulate narratives relating to territorial disputes, portray Russia as a victim of aggression, and undermine alliances such as NATO. The future of these operations remains uncertain following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin. It is imperative to address the morally coarsening effects of war and the amplification of callous reactions through social media platforms.